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Endogenous time discounting is introduced in a two-period human-capital-driven 
growth model: subjective discount rate depends upon the level of human capital. 
This assumption accords strongly with the micro-level evidence. In the model an 
individual optimizes consumption over two periods. Low human capital societies do 
not grow fast since high discount rate discourages schooling as the major form of 
savings. This implication is further reinforced by modeling the efficiency of 
schooling in the context of population pressure which is also driven by low human 
capital. The model  may produce multiple development regimes and it illustrates 
wider role of education in tackling possible development traps. 
  
Keywords:  growth, human capital, education, time discounting, discount rate, 
poverty.  
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1  Introduction 
 
In recent decades much of the attention of economists has been directed to understanding 
the determinants of economic growth. The results of many cross-country empirical 
studies underline the role of education and it has been shown that growth rate of GDP per 
capita and education level are highly correlated across countries (Benhabib and Spiegel 
1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). In Chart 1 this relationship  is shown for the low- 
and middle-income countries.  
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Source: World Development Indicators (2006); and Barro and Lee (2000) 
These data are for 76 low- and middle-income countries as defined in WDI for which these data 
are available. 
 
However, the correlation between education and growth appears to be too high to be fully 
reconciled with the micro-level estimates of the effects of education on individual 
productivity (Bils and Klenow 2000; Banerjee and Duflo 2005). Bils and Klenow (2000) 
calibrated a simple neoclassical growth model where the impact of education on 
individual productivity was consistent with the average coefficients of Mincerian returns 
to education that are commonly estimated in the labor literature. According to their 
results, the impact of education on productivity explains less than one third of high 
correlation between education and growth in the aggregate cross-country relationship.
 1
In addition to the role of human capital as a factor in the aggregate production function, 
there might be other effects that contribute to economic growth. For example, education 
may stimulate growth by inducing a lower fertility rate (Barro 2001). Psacharopoulos 
 
Similarly, World Bank (2006) acknowledges that “education impact on economic growth 
is well-established; precisely how this happens is less well-understood.”  
 
                                                        
1 The explanation of Bils and Klenow (2000) relies on the reverse causality, i.e. that high expected growth 
rate is reflected in higher returns to education and thus leads to increased demand for education.   
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(1994) summarizes also other less measurable channels like the effect of education on 
transaction costs, a  quality of democracy or  health. This paper focuses on additional 
pathway between education and growth. The model complements the empirically 
observed relationship between schooling and individual time discounting (Harrison, Lau 
and Williams 2002; Kirby et al. 2002; Bauer and Chytilová 2007a, 2008), underlines the 
role of human capital in economic growth and gives rise to the possibility of multiple 
development regimes. 
Time  discounting  may be a fundamental factor for explaining number of puzzling 
phenomena behind dismal economic performance particularly in countries with less 
developed economic institutions. If people are impatient, they may be reluctant to form 
savings or invest in profitable opportunities. They may also be less inclined to educate 
themselves and their children,  since  education may be understood as a long-term 
investment in future income. 
Many psychological studies from developed countries (e.g. Metcalfe and Mischel 1999) 
argue that humans are born impatient as patience can be regarded as a component of a 
broader set of non-cognitive skills. The abilities to imagine future, to structure problems 
and to plan scenarios help people to become more future-oriented (Becker and Mulligan 
1997). Learning to be future-oriented and to choose actions whose reward is postponed in 
time is essential part of our upbringing and educational process. Without such learning 
people would live solely by the present and would omit the pleasures that future events 
can bring.  
In the major study that elicits discount rate for a representative sample in a developed 
country Harrison, Lau and Williams (2002) showed on a sample of Danish households 
that highly educated adults have subjective discount rates as low as two thirds of those 
less educated. In the least developed countries the difference is likely to be even more 
profound as there may be additional pathways through which education makes people 
more patient. The evidence confirms that education enhances life expectancy through 
putting higher emphasis on prevention and healthier lifestyle (Mirowski and Ross 1998). 
Social norms embedded in traditional cultures may also direct individuals to focus on 
present gratifications and rely on “higher will” with respect to the future (Harrison and 
Huntington  2000).  Education typically reduces the role of  traditional believes in 
individual’s decision-making. 
The  emerging evidence from field experiments in developing countries  also  shows 
negative correlation between subjective discount rate as a measure of patience and 
education. Kirby et al. (2002) studied discount rate in remote villages in Bolivian rain 
forest. They found high average discount rate and that big proportion of its variance can 
be explained by the years of schooling, parental education and measures of qualitative 
education achievements in terms of mathematics and languages proficiency. In Vietnam 
Anderson et al. (2005) measured the stability of subjective discount rates when the delay 
varies. They also refer to the importance of education although they do not specifically 
measure it. Bauer and Chytilova elicited subjective discount rate in Ugandan (2007a) and 
Indian villages (2008)  and  found  negative correlation with the  level of completed 
education.
2
                                                        
2 On the other hand Pender (1996) in Indian villages finds correlation with recent income and credit 
constraints, but not with education. 
 In the Ugandan survey, they addressed the issue of possible mutual causality 
between education and discount rate. They use school frequency across villages and the 
number of school age years that overlap with the dictator Idi Amin’ rule as instruments 
and find significant impact of education on discount rate for men.    3 
This paper aims to integrate these empirical findings into a human-capital-driven, 
overlapping-generations  growth model. We will abandon the usual assumption of  the 
growth models about constant  exogenously given subjective discount rate.  A key 
component of our model is the assumption that subjective discount rate is high for low 
levels of human capital (education) and decreases with own and parental education. Our 
model theoretically illustrates how  this relationship may generate stable low-human 
capital equilibrium, where people have strong preference for current consumption, do not 
save and invest and hence the economy remains poor. 
There are a number of poverty trap models based on varying propensity to save (for 
survey see Azariadis and Stachurski 2004). It has typically been  assumed that poor 
people cannot save due to their low  income. Recently this argument was further 
elaborated in models which introduce endogeneization of life expectancy by allowing the 
probability of survival to depend on the level of development of the economy itself 
(Haaparta and Puhakka 2004; Chakraborty and Das 2005). It is argued that individuals 
(or governments) in poor countries cannot afford investing in their patience by investing 
in  health;  and  shorter  lifespan  consequently  distorts savings. The complementarity 
between the level of development and health may produce multiple equilibria. 
We believe the following model differs from the existing ones in the sense that high 
discount rate does not necessarily have to be related to an income constraint. Although 
we are still far from full understanding of patience formation in poor countries, from the 
available evidence it seems that being future-oriented  can  be learned at school and 
transmitted from parents. We construct a model where the discount rate is treated as a 
characteristic rooted in individual human capital, which encompasses the level of 
education and parental influence.
3
2  Model 
  
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by constructing a simple human capital 
growth model and later enrich the analysis with additional assumptions about wider 
effects of education. The economic dynamics, possibility of multiple development 
regimes and policy implications are then discussed. The final section concludes. 
 
2.1  Human capital and growth: standard model 
We begin with simple human-capital-driven model with overlapping-generations. The 
individuals live for two periods and we distinguish two types of individuals: „young“ and 
„old“. In our model, parents exhibit a standard type of perfect altruism as in mainstream 
dynastic models. Parents evaluate their children’s life prospects from the standpoint of 
their own preferences and induce them to schooling choices they regard as desirable. 
An individual is born at period t and maximizes her expected lifetime utility over 
consumption in two periods. We assume the individuals have the following utility 
function: 
                                                        
3 In compliance with the usual literature on economic growth we do assume that less educated individuals 
are able to maximize utility over time, only the weight they assign to future utility varies. Admittedly, some 
of the psychological arguments on why education makes an individual more future-oriented are compatible 
also with the notion of bounded rationality of less educated people. Analysis of bounded rationality could 
be an interesting extension of this issue. We thank T. Cahlík for this point.   4 
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where  t C  denotes consumption when individual is young,   1 + t C  is consumption during 
old age, and  ρ  is a subjective discount rate. The utility function is increasing and 
concave in consumption and Inada conditions hold.  
Young generation invests  in education and produces and consumes the output. Old 
generation acts only as a producer and consumer. An agent combines her initial human 
capital with labor to produce output  t y : 
t
t
t t l Ah y
1 − =                 (2) 
where  0 > A  is a productivity parameter. In the first period of life agents divide their time 
between schooling and labor supply. The total time available to agent is normalized to 
one and is spent only on working and schooling. Time spent on education  t s  is therefore 
t l − 1 , where t l  is time spent on working. We can rewrite the first-period production 
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−               (3) 
where  t s  is endogenous level of schooling chosen so that the individual utility is 
maximized, and 
1 − t
t h  is initial level of human capital in period t determined by choices in 
period t-1.  In general, we assume that human capital can either be transmitted from 
parents through innate abilities and upbringing, or accumulated through education. In the 
first period the level of human capital 
1 − t
t h  is derived only from parental human capital, 
because schooling is not completed. In the second period the inherited human capital is 
combined with the accumulated human capital gained by attending school.
  
Given this, an agent produces her human capital for the second period, 
t










+ =                 (4) 
where  0 ≥ B is the productivity parameter in human capital accumulation. 
Income in the second period is of the same form as in the first period. Agent no more 
invests in education through schooling. She spends all time on working and utilizes new 
human capital level.  
t
t ť Ah y 1 1 + + =                 (5) 
When combining (5) with human capital formation (4) we get 
t
t




+ = .              (6) 
In period one and period two agents consume all that is produced. There are no savings 
and bequests in the form of physical capital. 
t t C y =    1 1 + + = t t C y               (7) 
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The maximization problem  ( ) 1 , + t t C C MaxU  can be rewritten as follows  
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By differentiating (8) with respect to the level of schooling we get the optimal decision 
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The higher is the discount rate the less are the individuals inclined to study. Lower ρ  has 
a positive effect on human capital accumulation by increasing the amount of time devoted 
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This expression is crucial for generating growth and it is the major building block of the 
remainder of our analysis as it describes the equilibrium path of development. In the 
simplest version of this model the productivity parameter of human capital accumulation 
B and subjective discount rate ρ  determine if an economy develops perpetually along a 
constant positive growth path ( ρ + > 2 B ) or if it stagnates ( ρ + < 2 B ).  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the former situation. An increase in the efficiency of schooling or 
decrease in the subjective discount rate makes the condition for long-run growth more 
likely to be satisfied. The reason behind is straightforward, lower discount rate and higher 
efficiency of schooling motivates parents of young individuals to invest higher proportion 
of time into education and accumulate human capital. 
   6 
Figure 1: Human capital and growth 
 
2.2  Human capital and time discounting 
The implications of the model become more interesting when we link the subjective 
discount rate and the level of human capital. It is this feature that distinguishes this model 
from the existing ones. The effects of education on promoting planning abilities, health 
prevention and cultural influences mentioned earlier suggest negative relationship 
between the level of human capital and subjective discount rate. We will therefore 
assume that  ( ) 0 < ′ h ρ .
4
( ) 0 ' ' < h ρ
 We further assume that the strength of this effect is diminishing 
so that  . 
Again, the schooling choices are made in the first period under the influence of perfectly 
altruistic parents. The subjective discount rate that depends on parental human capital 
enters the utility function of the young individual: 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 ln
1
1
ln , , + − + +
+ = t t
t
t t t t C
h
C C C U
ρ
ρ       (11) 













. The lower the human capital in the family, the less patient is the young 
individual and the lower is the optimal level of schooling perceived by the individual and 
her parents. The transition function of human capital looks then as follows: 
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          (12) 
 
                                                        
4 Admitedly, we could have included two parameters, one for subjective discount rate and one for 
probability of survival – in our model it would be the probability that an agent survives to the second 
period.  These two sources determining the weight assigned to the future pleasures are practically difficult 
to distinguish. As both are dependent on human capital, we find it convenient to simplify the analysis by 
including only one variable encompassing both. The major results remain unchanged. 
t h  
1 + t h  
) 2 /( ρ + t th B  
45
0   7 
The role of human capital is now enlarged for its effect on discount rate and Figure 2 
shows the dynamics of the economy. This non-convexity gives rise to the S-shaped 
transition curve and hence the possibility of multiple development regimes and a poverty 
trap emerges. As in the surveying article of Azariadis and Stachurski (2004) on poverty 
traps we define a poverty trap as a self-reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to 
persist. It is a result of individually optimal choices but at the same time it depends on 
initial conditions of the endogenous variables which can shape long run outcomes and 
prevent sustained growth. 
 
 




Low-income equilibrium appears if the efficiency of education system is too low 
compared to the individual discount rate, specifically if  B h
t
t > +
− ) ( 2
1 ρ . In such a 
situation there is negative human capital accumulation. In the environment of low human 
capital, people discount future income heavily and accumulate insufficient level of 
human  capital. However, when the threshold level of human capital is overcome 
autonomous growth gets generated.  
Endogenous  subjective discount rate  poses  difficulties for a welfare analysis.  As a 
consequence of varying  time preference the form of the utility function  changes  for 
different levels of human capital. In such a case, it is not possible to compare individual’s 
well-being in alternative situations.  
 
2.3  Human capital, time discounting and population growth 
The likelihood of low-income equilibrium in the model may be further reinforced by 
considering factors that influence the efficiency of schooling B which we have so far 
treated as a constant. A variety of evidence (e.g. Greenwald, Hedges and Laine 1996) 
suggests that schools with more resources per student deliver more efficient outcomes to 
the studying individuals. We approximate the functional form as  ( ) t t n T B B , = , where T  
represents public resources invested into the education system which are not paid by 
individuals and  t n  is population growth. Per capita public expenditures on education 
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determine the class size, training of the teachers, availability of books and other school 
equipment or may reduce the financial exposure from the side of individuals by 
eliminating school fees. In poor countries public education expenditures are usually under 
constant pressure from rapid population growth. For example, the pupil teacher ratio on 
primary schools in sub-Saharan Africa is three times higher than in high-income 
countries (Glewwe and Kremer 2005). Hence it is plausible to assume a positive 
relationship between the level of expenditures into education and the efficiency of 







n T B t   and negative relationship with respect to population 











In addition, empirical studies based on the World Fertility Surveys and the Demographic 
and Health Surveys establish strong negative correlation between education and fertility 
in the  developing countries (e.g.  Martin 1995). This correlation is even of bigger 
magnitude than the correlation with per capita income. Recent micro-level studies found 
a significant causal impact of education on lowering fertility (Breierova and Duflo 2002; 
Bauer and Chytilová 2007b). The relationship has also been illustrated theoretically in the 
model of human capital and endogenous fertility by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990).  
In compliance with this literature we assume that population growth at period t depends 




t t h n n ,  0 ) ( < ′ h n  and  0 ) ( < ′ ′ h n . 
The transition path (12) emerges now as: 




















h n T B h
ρ
          (13) 
Again the resulting transition function is compatible with the possibility of multiple 
development regimes. There are now two non-convexities with respect to human capital 
built into the model. First, for low levels of initial human capital people discount future 
heavily. Secondly, the efficiency of schooling is low due to the rapid population growth 
which is also rooted in the low levels of human capital. These two effects jointly 
undermine the motivation of the young generation to attend school. For countries with 
uneducated population the dynamic behavior of the society does not generate sufficient 
level of human capital for growth, because the optimal level of schooling is too low (see 
Appendix A for algebraic derivation). The two charts below illustrate  the dynamics 
graphically. On the left hand side the transition curve (13) is depicted. The chart on right 
hand side goes further behind the slope of the transition curve by showing how  t ρ  and 
t B  are associated with human capital. 
   9 
Figure 3: Human capital, time discounting and population growth 
 
If  ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ,












t h h . People discount future pleasures heavily, have high numbers of children, the 
efficiency of schooling is low, and as a consequence people  chose a  low level of 
education.  If  ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ,




t h h n T B ρ , the economy is on the positive development 
path. People are future oriented, fertility is low, efficiency of schooling high, and people 
invest in their human capital. 
The outcome of the economy may then depend on initial conditions in terms of human 
capital. An economy with the human capital below 
threshold
t h  converges to the low 
equilibrium, whereas the economy with the initial human capital stock above 
threshold
t h  
grows perpetually.
5




t h h n T B ρ
 The threshold level of human capital is an unstable equilibrium. In 
this situation  . 
 
Our model shows that in the environment of low human capital, a high level of time 
discounting and a low efficiency of schooling, economic agents make choices such that 
poverty may become persistent. The model implies particularly important role of public 
action into the education systems in least developed countries. Higher public 
expenditures  focused  on increasing quality or reducing direct costs of education (T) 
increase the efficiency of schooling as perceived by individuals (B). Higher „returns“ 
from attending school are then more likely to overweight the high subjective discount rate 
in individual schooling choices. Higher T can be illustrated as a shift of  ( ) ( ) t h n T B ,  curve 
upwards (right hand side of Figure 3) or as anti-clockwise rotation of the transition curve 
(left hand side of Figure 3). As a result the threshold level of human capital decreases and 




                                                        
5 Once we assume decreasing returns to scale of human capital taking place above certain level of human 
capital, the economy would converge to high steady state and would not grow perpetually. However, for 
the sake of simplicity we keep constant returns to scale on the whole interval.  
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3  Conclusions 
 
The subjective discount rate is an important factor in determining the life-cycle behavior 
of individuals. A high level of time discounting may help to explain widely observed 
phenomena in the poorest countries such as low savings, school attendance or investment 
rates. At the same time it is the usual practice to assume that the discount rate is wholly 
exogenous and independent on personal characteristics and economic conditions. The 
paper complements recent micro-level evidence from field studies in the least developed 
countries that demonstrate close negative relationship between education and individual 
time  discounting. In accordance  with this evidence the paper  integrates an additional 
assumption about negative impact of human capital on individual subjective discount rate 
into a human-capital-driven growth model. 
In this model an individual optimizes consumption over two periods by dividing her time 
between schooling and work in the first period. The endogenous level of schooling 
represents individual savings between the two periods. It is demonstrated that in the low-
human capital environment the individual discount rate may be too high compared to the 
efficiency of schooling. Consequently,  the individual optimal schooling choices may 
result in a negative or low dynamics of human capital accumulation and a low human 
capital equilibrium may emerge. The theoretical predictions are further reinforced once 
we model the school efficiency in the context of population pressure that largely stems 
from low education levels as demonstrated by large body of empirical evidence. 
The analysis points to education investments as prerequisite for sustained economic 
growth as its wider impacts are particularly important in countries with less developed 
economic institutions. The relationship between education, time discounting and fertility 
is consistent with slower growth in poor countries than predicted by standard theory and 
may even result in a development trap, where initial conditions in terms of human capital 
matter and threshold effects appear. 
As noted earlier, it has been widely observed in cross-country analyses that standard 
estimates of the contribution of additional schooling to economic growth, based on 
productivity differences associated with differences in the level of schooling, cover only a 
smaller portion of the total correlation between education and subsequent growth. The 
paper may help to reconcile this important puzzle by analyzing additional channel 
through which education promotes economic growth -  by shaping individual time 
discounting.  
   11 
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Appendix   






































 (13) underlines the broader role of human 
capital in this model and shows three channels through which human capital influences 
growth dynamics especially in less developed countries: 
    (14) 
The first item on the right hand side is the standard result. It shows how optimal 
schooling time translates into the new human capital. The second item represents the 
effect through decreased discount rate. The third item represents the impact through 
decreased population growth and hence increased education efficiency. All three items 
are positive ensuring positive slope of the transition function. 



























































































 (15)  
The necessary condition for the existence of low-human-capital equilibrium is the convex 












. The equation (15) confirms that convex shape of the transition function is 
very likely in our model. The first four items on the right hand side are positive, whereas 
the last two items are negative and the relative magnitudes differ with the level of human 
capital. However, to ensure the convex shape of the transition function we would need to 
make additional assumptions about specific functional forms of B(.),  (.) ρ  and n(.). 
 
                                                        
6 For simplicity the upperscripts are omitted in the derivations.  
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